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In a term primarily noteworthy for its unusual quiet on the securi-
ties law front, the Seventh Circuit decided few important securities
cases in 1981-82. In two very different cases, however, the court ven-
tured into uncharted waters, with generally mixed results. Thus, in
Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Helfand,I the court addressed the power
of a district court to exclude a class member from participation in a
settlement fund because of an allegedly unique defense available
against that class member. In Chicago Board of Trade v. Securities and
Exchange Commission,2 the court was called upon to decide whether
the Securities and Exchange Commission had authority to regulate
trading in options on Government National Mortgage Association cer-
tificates, given that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission had
already assumed jurisdiction in the trading of futures in these
securities.
This article will begin with an analysis of the Curtiss-Wright deci-
sion and will then briefly discuss the United States Supreme Court's
review of a 1980 Seventh Circuit decision holding the Illinois Business
Takeover Act unconstitutional. 3 Finally, two other securities opinions
handed down by the Seventh Circuit during the 1981-82 term will be
reviewed, 4 including one dealing with the emerging "sale of business"
* Partner, Meites & Frackman, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Harvard College (1965); J.D.,
Harvard Law School (1969).
** Associate, Meites & Frackman, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Mundelein College (1971); J.D.,
Chicago Kent College of Law (1981).
1. 687 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.),petrtionfor review dismissed as moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
3. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affl'dsub nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp. 102
S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
4. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703
(7th Cir. 1982).
The Seventh Circuit decided several other securities cases which will not be discussed in this
article. See, e.g., Portnoy v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 678 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1982), a case involv-
ing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), which prohibits in-
sider trading and short-swing profits. The Portnoy court followed Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) and Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S.
232 (1976), in holding that since liability under § 16(b) requires that the insider be the beneficial
owner of a 10% interest in an issuing corporation's securities both at the time of the purchase and
at the time of the sale, and since a person purchasing securities which put his holdings above the
10% level is not a 10% "beneficial owner" at the time of his limit-exceeding purchase, such a
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exception to federal securities law coverage.
DISAPPROVAL OF CLAIMS IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Curtiss- Wright Corporation v. He/fand
In an unusual case this past term the Seventh Circuit was called on
to decide, apparently as a matter of first impression, the power of a
district court to disapprove the claim of a class member for pro rata
participation in a class settlement fund because of allegedly unique de-
fenses available against that class member. In Curtiss- Wright Corpora-
tion v. He//and,5 a panel of the Seventh Circuit 6 held that the district
court had the authority to disapprove such a claim under its general
equitable powers over class action settlements.
Curtiss- Wright arose out of the notorious Cenco fraud,7 in which
Cenco, a company whose stock was listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, created an inflated value for its stock by inflating the value of
its inventories. When the fraud was exposed the stock price collapsed.
Soon thereafter, a class action was brought in the district court in Chi-
cago against Cenco and others on behalf of Cenco shareholders who
had bought Cenco shares at inflated prices during the fraud and had
seen their investments plummet. The suit, alleging violations of the
federal securities laws and common law fraud, was certified as a class
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).8 The class con-
sisted of all purchasers of Cenco common stock during the period of
the 1970-75 fraud.
person is not required to account to the corporation for any profit realized on the sale of these
securities within six months of purchase. 678 F.2d at 697-98.
5. 687 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit's holding regarding the district court's
power to disapprove class members' claims has an important impact, not only in securities law but
on class action settlements in general.
6. Judge Posner wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel which included Judge Bauer
and Judge Swygert.
7. Other cases arising out of the Cenco fraud include Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,
686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussion of the standards under Illinois law governing the liability
of Cenco's independent auditors for failing to detect the fraud by Cenco's management; upholding
jury's finding that the auditors were not guilty of breach of contract, professional malpractice
(negligence) and fraud); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirmance of crimi-
nal convictions of Cenco officers); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. I11. 1977) (SEC
unsuccessfully sought injunction against future violations by Cenco pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976)); Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D. I (N.D. Ill. 1977) (certifi-
cation of class action).
8. 687 F.2d at 172. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
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In 1974, before the fraud was publicly revealed, Curtiss-Wright
began purchasing large amounts of Cenco stock. Within a few months
it had acquired five percent of Cenco's outstanding stock and entered
into negotiations with Cenco regarding a large loan to Cenco and pos-
sible acquisition of an even larger stock position.9
While it was considering increasing its position in Cenco, Curtiss-
Wright's auditor was permitted to conduct a one-week business review
of Cenco. Despite this review, which produced significant negative in-
formation not generally available to investors,' 0 Curtiss-Wright contin-
ued buying Cenco stock until it had acquired some sixteen percent of
the oustanding shares, making it by far the largest holder." In the
wake of the unmasking of the fraud, Curtiss-Wright used its dominant
position to appoint three persons to Cenco's board, including Cenco's
new chief executive officer. Consequently, when Curtiss-Wright found
itself a member of the purchaser class in the class action litigation, it
agreed with Cenco not to sue Cenco as a defrauded share purchaser
other than as a passive class member.
12
Upon learning that Curtiss-Wright had made substantial
purchases subsequent to its discovery of the adverse information and
had then used its shareholding position to name new board members
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of con-
centrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b).
9. 687 F.2d at 172.
10. Id. Curtiss-Wright's auditor found that Cenco had poor accounting controls, a low rate of
inventory turnover, $10 million worth of obsolete inventory and inadequate quarterly reports. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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and the current chief executive officer, the class representatives moved
to add Curtiss-Wright as a third-party defendant and to exclude it from
the class. 13 While this motion was pending, plaintiffs obtained court
approval of a settlement of the class claims against Cenco. The settle-
ment contained a provision that Curtiss-Wright's pro rata share of the
settlement be retained in an escrow account pending resolution of the
motion to exclude it from the class.' 4 Similar action was taken when
settlements were approved first with the individual defendants and
then with Cenco's accountants.' 5 The district court then held that Cur-
tiss-Wright should only participate in the settlement with respect to
Cenco purchases that predated its business review, and refused to grant
Curtiss-Wright an evidentiary hearing on the issue. 16 Curtiss-Wright
appealed. 17
In the Seventh Circuit Curtiss-Wright first argued that, since it was
concededly a class member, having purchased Cenco stock during the
relevant time period, the court below lacked the power to deny its
timely filed claim to participate pro rata in the settlement fund. Alter-
natively, it argued that such a denial could be made only after an ad-
versary determination of the alleged defense to its claim.' 8 The
Seventh Circuit unanimously rejected both arguments. 19 It viewed
Curtiss-Wright's first argument as a challenge to the power of a district
court to modify a settlement agreement over the objection of a class
member. The court found this question not presented by the case
before it since the settlements, as submitted to and approved by the
court below, included an express reservation of the motion to exclude
Curtiss-Wright from participation. Therefore, the court noted, Curtiss-
Wright was on notice that it faced the possibility of being denied par-
ticipation in the settlement fund and in fact had the right to exclude
itself from the class or to object to the settlement thus structured,
neither of which it chose to do.
20
13. Id.
14. Answering Brief for Appellee at 6, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687 F.2d 171 (7th
Cir. 1982).
15. The district court's approval of these settlements was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in
an unpublished order, Helfand v. Fromkin, No. 80-2091 (7th Cir. July 13, 1981).
16. 687 F.2d at 172-73.
17. Id. at 173.
18. Id. at 173-74.
19. Id. at 175.
20. Id. at 173. In passively accepting the settlement as proposed, Curtiss-Wright may have
been influenced by its agreement not to sue Cenco except as a passive member of the class. The
Seventh Circuit suggested that this agreement was to cure Curtiss-Wright's uneasiness at being, in
a de facto sense, on both sides of the litigation-a member of the plaintiff class suing Cenco and
Cenco's principal shareholder who had named present management. Id.
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The reserved motion to exclude Curtiss-Wright from the settle-
ment may more properly be analyzed as a motion to amend the class
definition rather than to amend the settlement agreement as Curtiss-
Wright argued.21 Curtiss-Wright was within the literal language of the
class as defined-all persons who purchased Cenco stock during the
period of the fraud. 22 What the district court was in fact doing was
considering a motion to redefine and limit the class to those who had
bought stock in Cenco during the period of the fraud and who did not
possess the adverse information which had been discovered by Curtiss-
Wright in its business review. There is no doubt that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) all class certifications are conditional
and subject to modification at any time.23 Further, it is not uncommon
for classes to be defined in terms of those injured by the wrongdoing, as
Curtiss-Wright had allegedly not been since it purchased with knowl-
edge of the fraud.24 The court quite properly left for another day the
far more difficult question of the power of a court to modify the terms
of a settlement either after or in the course of approval.
25
The more difficult question is what sort of proceeding is required
to determine whether a claimant is or is not a member of the class as
redefined, which here would be all who purchased during the claim
period and as to whom Cenco did not have a valid defense. Curtiss-
Wright argued that judicial determination of the existence of a valid
defense was required before such a class-membership determination
could be made. 26 This argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit.
27
21. Id.
22. Id. at 172.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) ("An order under this subdivision [certifying a class] may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits"). See also Social
Services Union, Local 535 v. County of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 1979) ("If at any
time before, during, or after trial it appears that for any reason the unions no longer fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class, class status may be withdrawn or appropriately modi-
fied"); Guerine v. J. & W. Investment, Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A decision as to
class certification is not immutable. Rule 23(c)(1) empowers and requires a court to carefully
scrutinize the adequacy of representation in all class actions"); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 71 F.R.D. 334, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("The certification can be amended at any time
before a decision on the merits and, under some circumstances, even thereafter").
24. See, e.g., Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 89 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Edmondson
v. Simon, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also Alliance to End Repres-
sion v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977), for a discussion of the propriety of defining a class
in terms of those injured by defendant's wrongdoing.
25. Since approval of a class settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) turns on
the court's determination that the settlement is fair and reasonable, Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Abate v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 419
U.S. 900 (1974), a post-approval modification of the class definition would seem to require new
notice and another fairness determination, with a class member who would be excluded presuma-
bly having a chance to object and appeal.
26. 687 F.2d at 173-74.
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The court first noted, in dicta, that if the test was as proposed by
Curtiss-Wright, Curtiss-Wright would prevail, since Cenco did not
have a good defense against Curtiss-Wright. It noted that at worst Cur-
tiss-Wright was guilty of negligence in buying Cenco shares after ob-
taining information from which they should have discerned fraud and
that negligence is not an affirmative defense to an intentional tort such
as fraudulent misstatement. 28  While the court in this dicta followed
earlier holdings of the Seventh Circuit and other courts, 29 it perhaps
did not do justice to Cenco's potential defense against Curtiss-Wright.
The case law seems reasonably clear that, at least in the case of affirma-
tive misrepresentations and misstatements, reliance is a relevant ele-
ment of a claim in a section lOb-5 action.30 Allegedly, Curtiss-Wright
had actual knowledge of the unfavorable state of Cenco's affairs. Thus,
it is difficult to see how it could prevail, at least as to its post-business
review purchases, in showing that it had relied on the false statements
prepared by Cenco regarding inventory and other matters.3'
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the validity of
Cenco's defense need not be determined. Rather, the court saw the
question as one of relative equities between Curtiss-Wright and other
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id.
29. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468-72 (5th Cir. 1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure to exercise due care or diligence is
not an available defense in a Rule lOb-5 intentional fraud case); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d
687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977) (plaintiff in a lOb-5 case is not required to
investigate the truth or falsity of an intentional misrepresentation unless it is patently false).
30. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1981), and cases
cited therein. See also Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), yacated and dismissed as
moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981). There is a dispute
as to whether reliance need be proved initially by the plaintiff or whether it can be presumed,
subject to rebuttal. Thus, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972),
the Court held that in cases involving primarily a failure to disclose, "Ja]Il that is necessary is that
the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important." This policy has been expanded by some courts to not require plaintiffs to affirma-
tively establish reliance in a lOb-5 action when material omissions occur in a fraud-upon-the-
market situation. Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D I, 8 (N.D. In. 1977), and cases cited therein.
However, Affiliated Ule and subsequent cases did not abolish the reliance requirement, but rather
established a rebuttable presumption of reliance where it is logical to assume that reliance in fact
existed but would be unduly burdensome to prove, as in instances of non-disclosure. E.g., Shores
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cit. 1981). Unlike the situation envisioned in Affiliated Ule, this case
concerns affirmative misrepresentations as well as omissions on Cenco's part. It is hardly logical
to assume that Curtiss-Wright placed any reliance whatsoever in Cenco's inflated figures after it
received the report from its auditors.
31. See supra note 10. The rest of the class, in contrast, argued that, in purchasing Cenco's
shares at an inflated price, they indirectly relied on Cenco's misstatements since these statements
had been taken into account by the market. Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D I (N.D. I11. 1977).
Such indirect proof of reliance in open market purchase cases is common. See, e.g., Shores v.
Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. See also Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated and dismissed as moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
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claimants to the class settlement fund.3 2 Noting that the class device is
equitable in origin, as is the process of allocating inadequate funds
among competing claimants, the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court's equitable powers permitted an equitable allocation of funds.
33
The court thus held that, as compared to the other claimants to the
fund, who it assumed did not have inside knowledge as to the true state
of affairs, Curtiss-Wright lacked equity and should take nothing on its
post-business review purchases.
34
The cases on which the Seventh Circuit relied for allocating shares
in a settlement on the basis of an equitable balancing between claim-
ants to a fund at most suggest that the district court, in administrating
settlements, had broad, equitable discretion. No case, however, sug-
gests that a chancellor has the power to determine summarily, and
without an adversary determination of the disputed facts, such ques-
tions as the validity of Cenco's defense against Curtiss-Wright or Cur-
tiss-Wright's relative equities as compared to the other claimants.
35
The fact that the balancing of equities is between competing claimants
rather than a plaintiff and a defendant is not enough to deny Curtiss-
Wright its due process right to a full factual presentation. In the closely
analogous areas of equitable receiverships and challenges by claimants
who are in the same class in bankruptcy proceedings, the same rela-
tionship between competing claimants to a limited res exists. 36 Yet it is
32. 687 F.2d at 174.
33. Id. See also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See generally CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 169-70, 223 (1950).
34. Id. at 175. There was no evidence on the record that any other class members knew or
should have known of Cenco's fraudulent misstatements. However, the class representatives had
apparently made no effort to determine whether any of the thousands of other class members, like
Curtiss-Wright, had had access to the adverse information before purchasing.
35. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173,
1178-79 (9th Cir. 1977) and In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 603 F.2d
1353, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1979), appears to be misplaced. In Marshall, the court was discussing the
propriety of a settlement in which "each class member was offered 100% of the amount he paid."
In In re Equity Funding Corp. of 4merica Securities Litigation, the court was discussing the propri-
ety of an offset provision in a settlement which applied equally to all debentureholders, an entire
subset of claimants. Neither case even mentions a situtation where the district court judge's dis-
cretion was being exercised to reduce the award of only one claimant, absent any factual hearing.
For a more common approach to resolving disputed class members' claims in securities suits in
which each disputed claim is examined on its facts, see Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 352 (D.
Del. 1981). See generally Meites & Aborn, Distributing the Settlement Fund in a Class Action, 1980
A.B.A. Sec. Lit. vol. 7, no. 4, 33.
36. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Rule 201 and Bankruptcy Act of 1978, § 502, 11 U.S.C. § 502
(Supp. V 1981). This procedure is also followed in common law receiverships, which are an equi-
table analogue to class action proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Bank-
ruptcy Rule 306(c); Collier on Bankruptcy, 502.01121-[3] (15th ed. 1979). See also Heyman v.
Kemp (In re Teltronics, Ltd.), 649 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1981) (receiver); Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission v. Probber Int'l Equities Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (receiver).
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clear, both in terms of the settled case law and the governing statutes
and rules, that an objection to a claim is not to be resolved summarily
or on the basis of relative equity when compared with other claims of
the same class. Rather, such an objection should be decided with the
usual procedural safeguards employed to determine the objective valid-
ity of the claim. 37 In suggesting that a district court can summarily
deny claims to a class settlement under its general equitable powers, the
court thus seems to have given less than adequate consideration to the
due process considerations involved and to the established procedures
in analogous equitable situations.
38
STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
Supreme Court Affirmance of Mite Corp. v. Dixon
In the 1980-81 term, the Seventh Circuit dealt with a case which
raised the issue of the limits of state authority to regulate the takeover
of publicly held corporations. In Mite Corp. v. Dixon ,39 the court held
that the Illinois Business Takeover Act 4° was preempted under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it conflicted with the
Williams Act.4' The Seventh Circuit further held that the Illinois Act
violated the Commerce Clause because it substantially obstructed in-
terstate commerce.
42
The Illinois Act required that any takeover offer for the shares of a
37. This is not to say that a procedure short of an evidentiary hearing may not be appropriate
in some cases. See, e.g., Airlines Stewards v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.
1972); In re Calpa Products Co., 249 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
38. In stressing that such action is necessitated by the compulsory nature of a class settle-
ment, the court misses the point. While it is true that a class member who does not opt out can be
forced to participate in a settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), see supra note
8, such participation cannot be conditioned on a relinquishment of due process rights. See, e.g.,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Airline Stewards v. American Airlines, Inc.,
455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1972); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Moreover,
there is no conflict between due process and compulsory treatment, since a court that approves a
settlement with a narrowly drawn class (i.e., all who were injured by the misstatements, all who
relied, etc.) can then, consistent with due process, fashion objective, adversary procedures to adju-
dicate class membership and the right to participate in the settlement fund. Here, for example, the
district court could have adjudicated the sole issue of the adequacy of the alleged defense, a rela-
tively simple matter, as seen by the Seventh Circuit's summary disposition. 687 F.2d at 174.
39. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), afl'dsub. nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mite Corp., see Collens, Securities Law: De-
veloptments in Takeovers, Securities Fraud and Insider Trading in the Seventh Circuit, 58 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 509, 521 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Securities Law].
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 137.51-.70 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as the Illinois Act].
41. 633 F.2d at 498. See supra note 51, and text accompanying notes 52-53 for a brief discus-
sion of the Williams Act.
42. 633 F.2d at 502.
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target company must be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State. 43
Section 137.57.E of the Illinois Act empowered the Illinois Secretary of
State to pass upon the substantive fairness of a tender offer and to pro-
hibit it from going forward if, in his opinion, the offer was "inequita-
ble." The Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Act's approach to
investor protection by "benevolent bureaucracy" was preempted by the
conflicting approach of the Williams Act"which contemplates unfet-
tered choice by well-informed investors. ' 45 The Seventh Circuit also
found that other provisions of the Illinois Act conflicted with the Wil-
liams Act, since the Illinois Act provided that hearings on the takeover
offer may be required and that a takeover offer must be filed twenty
days before becoming effective. 46 The court found that these provi-
sions might well result in unacceptable delay, which could enhance in-
cumbent management's ability to defeat a tender offer, to the detriment
of investors.4 7 Further, the court held that because the Illinois Act sub-
stantially obstructed interstate commerce, without countervailing local
benefit, it "violated the commerce clause."
'48
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.54.A (1981). The Seventh Circuit stated that:
[Tlhe [Illinois] Act reaches every tender offer made for any corporation that meets, inter
alia, two of the following conditions:
(a) has its principal executive office in [Illinois];
(b) is organized under the laws of [Illinois];
(c) has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in
[Illinois].
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 , § 137.52-10 (1979). Thus, the Act grants jurisdiction to
the Secretary of State over tender offers that would not affect a single Illinois
shareholder.
633 F.2d at 501 (footnote omitted). The Act also applied to tender offers made for corporations
for which 10% of the outstanding shares were held by Illinois residents. Id. at 501 n.27. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.52-10 (1981). Section 137.52-9 of the Act defines "takeover offer" as
"the offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity security of a target company, pursuant to a
tender offer." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.52-9 (1981). The terms "tender offer" and "take-
over offer" are used interchangeably, and a "tender offer" is usually understood to mean "a pub-
licly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale
at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973).
44. 633 F.2d at 493. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57.E (1981).
45. 633 F.2d at 494.
46. Id. at 495. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.54.E (1981).
47. 633 F.2d at 494-95. The Seventh Circuit concluded that:
[Tihe Illinois Act is preempted by the Williams Act because the former (1) tends inordi-
nately to substitute regulatory control for investor autonomy, (2) provides for hearings
the institution of which may be indirectly delegated to incumbent management and
which are potentially interminable in length, (3) provides for other delays and mecha-
nisms for delay which are potentially grossly in excess of the delay mandated by Con-
gress and deemed by Congress to be appropriate to the protection of investors and
(4) provides for lengthy prenotification delay, a requirement Congress specifically
rejected.
Id. at 498-99.
48. Id. at 502.
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In affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision, the United States
Supreme Court49 noted that because nothing in the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 explicitly prohibits states from regulating take-
overs °5 0 and since it would be possible to comply with the provisions of
both the Williams and Illinois Acts, the issue for consideration was
whether the Illinois Act frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act in
some substantial way.5' The Court then noted that in imposing the
requirements embodied in the Williams Act, Congress intended to pro-
tect investors, and that a "major aspect" of the congressional effort to
protect investors was to avoid favoring either management or the take-
over bidder.5 2 Thus, the investor protection which Congress sought to
embody in the Williams Act consisted not only of furnishing the neces-
sary information to investors but also of "withholding from manage-
ment or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the
exercise of an informed choice."' 53 The Supreme Court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that there were three provisions of the Illinois Act that
upset this congressional balance.54 First, under the Illinois Act's re-
quired twenty-day precommencement notification period, the offeror
could not communicate its offer to the target company's shareholders;
the target company, however, was free to disseminate information on
the impending offer to its own shareholders.5 5 Second, the Illinois Act
allowed either the Secretary of State or incumbent management to use
the hearing provisions of the Act to delay a tender offer indefinitely.56
Third, the Illinois Act allowed the Secretary of State to pass on the
substantive fairness of a tender offer. The Secretary was required to
deny the registration of a tender offer if the offer failed to provide full
and fair disclosure to the offerees or if the Secretary determined that
49. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982), af'g, Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th
Cir. 1980).
50. In fact, § 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides, in pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1976).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 2635. "The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional response to
the increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that had 'removed a
substantial number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws.'" Id. at 2635-36 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 2636.
53. Id. at 2636-37.
54. Id. at 2637.
55. Id. at 2637-38. The Williams Act does not contain a pre-commencement notification
provision. Id. at 2637-38 and n. 11.
56. Id. at 2638-39 and n.13.
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the offer was inequitable.5 7 The legislative history of the Williams Act,
however, indicated that Congress left the determination of the fairness
of a tender offer to the discretion of the investor.58 The Court further
held that the Illinois Act was invalid under the Commerce Clause.
When the more stringent terms of the Illinois Act were not satisfied, the
Act directly regulated and prevented interstate tender offers thus inhib-
iting interstate transactions. Consequently, the Illinois Act imposed a
substantial burden on interstate commerce which outweighed the local
interest which it purported to further.
59
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the Seventh Circuit indicates
that the proliferation of state takeover statutes, many of them similar to
the Illinois Act6°-with its tilt in favor of incumbent management and
its adoption of "big-brother" protectionism as opposed to the informed
free-choice decision-making by investors which Congress envisioned
when it passed the Williams Act-may be an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with federal regulation of securities. The Court affirmed the Sev-
enth Circuit's finding that the Illinois Act imposed a significantly
increased burden on interstate commerce in an area where Congress
did not intend it, and this decision will presumably discourage other
state attempts to regulate takeover offers.
SECURITIES FRAUD
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) 6' and
57. Id. at 2639 and n.15. Seegeneraly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 /, § 137.54.E (1981).
58. Id. at 2639-40.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 2640. In holding that the Illinois Act directly regulated interstate commerce,
the Court stated that:
Mite's offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders [for their stock] necessarily employed inter-
state facilities in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions
occurring across state lines. These transactions would themselves be interstate com-
merce. Yet the Illinois law, unless complied with, sought to prevent Mite from making
its offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with Chicago Rivet's stockhold-
ers living in Illinois, but also with those living in other states and having no connection
with Illinois.
Id. at 2641. Further, the Court found that while Illinois had a legitimate interest in protecting
resident security holders, this interest was insufficient to outweigh the burden which the Illinois
Act imposed on interstate commerce. Id. at 2642. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
60. More than two-thirds of the states have enacted legislation similar to the Illinois Act. See
SECURITIES LAW, supra note 26, at 523 n. 119 (citing Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the
Takeover Game.- The Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams
Act, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 409, 441 (1980)).
61. Section 10(b) provides:
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Rule lOb-5, 6 2 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), 63 prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase and sale
of securities. During the 1981-82 term, the Seventh Circuit decided two
section 10(b) cases. One case clarified the continuing discussion of the
definition of a "security" while the other addressed questions of materi-
ality, scienter and the statute of limitations.
Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc.
In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc. ,6 the Seventh Circuit addressed
the question of whether the sale of a business, through the sale of all of
its stock, constituted the sale of a "security." Relying on its earlier de-
cision in Frederiksen v. Poloway,65 the Court held that such a transac-
tion did not fall within the definition of a "security" and thus furthered
the emerging "sale of business" exception to Rule lOb-5.
66
The controversy in Canfield began when Rapp & Son, Inc.,
purchased all of the outstanding shares of stock of the Twigg Corpora-
tion from its three owners, one of whom was Canfield. After the trans-
action, Canfield sued to enforce a provision of the sales agreement
67
and Rapp counterclaimed, 68 alleging that the sale violated both federal
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe ...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
62. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)(1976) (established the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1976) (gives the
SEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations).
64. 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
65. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). For a discussion of the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Frederikson, see Securities Law, supra note 39, at 533.
66. 654 F.2d at 460.
67. Id. at 462 n.3.
68. Canfield's original claim became moot, and only Rapp's counterclaims were tried by the
district court. Id.
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and Indiana securities law and also constituted common law fraud.69
Specifically, Rapp alleged that during negotiations Canfield misrepre-
sented the status of government equipment leased by Twigg from the
United States Air Force,70 and that Rapp relied on Canfield's misrepre-
sentations and omissions as to this equipment when it negotiated the
agreement to buy Twigg.7 1 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that Rapp had failed to establish the material elements
of a federal or state securities law claim. 72 The court further upheld the
district court's finding that Canfield's alleged misrepresentation did not
give rise to a common law fraud action under Indiana law. 73 Finally,
the Seventh Circuit agreed that, under the circumstances, the transac-
tion was not a sale of a "security" for securities law purposes.
7 4
The Seventh Circuit affirmed based on its decision in Frederik-
sen. 75 In Frederiksen, plaintiffs purchased both the assets and the stock
in defendant's corporation and subsequently sued the sellers under the
federal securities laws, alleging fraudulent misrepresentations. 76 The
Seventh Circuit held that although in form the sale was a sale of securi-
ties and thus literally within the language of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, the transaction in Frederiksen was not covered by the federal
securities laws. 77 In so holding, the court relied on the "economic real-
ity" test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman ,78 which requires that three ele-
ments be present in order for an instrument to qualify as a security:
69. Id. at 461.
70. Id. at 461-62.
71. Id. at 462.
72. Id. at 462, 468.
73. Id. at 463, 468.
74. Id. at 462-63, 465-66. In defining "security," the Seventh Circuit stated:
Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) defines "security" as
follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
The definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)l0
is substantially the same. The two definitions are considered functional equivalents.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
Id. at 463 n.5 (emphasis added). See also Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1976).
75. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
76. Id. at 1148-49.
77. Id. at 1150-51.
78. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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"(1) an investment in a common venture; (2) premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits; (3) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. '7 9  In Frederickson, the plaintiffs'
purchase did not satisfy the first and third elements of the Forman test
and so the transfer of an entire business, although in form the sale of
stock, did not involve the purchase or sale of a "security.
80
Similar to its holding in Frederiksen, the Canfield court held that
Rapp's purchase of Twigg Corporation failed to satisfy two elements of
the economic reality test. It did not satisfy the first element, investment
in a common venture, because this requires a "sharing or pooling of
funds."' 8 ' Since Rapp purchased all the Twigg Corporation stock, there
was no sharing or pooling of funds.82 The third element of the test-
that profits be derived from the efforts of others-was also not satisfied
because Rapp took over management and control of Twigg.
83
Rapp attempted to distinguish Frederiksen in two ways. First, he
argued that the economic reality test should not apply if a transaction
involves "stock" that has all the attributes of ordinary common stock,
since such stock is clearly within the definition of a "security. ' 84 He
further argued that the Forman analysis should be applicable only to
transactions that do not fall clearly within the definition of a "secur-
ity."' 85 Rapp thus concluded that, because the stock he purchased had
all the attributes of ordinary common stock, he should not be required
to satisfy the economic reality test before gaining the protection of the
securities laws.86 The court rejected this argument and reaffirmed its
holding in Frederiksen that "'economic reality' is always the key is-
sue."187 Rapp next argued that Frederiksen involved a simultaneous
sale of assets and stock and that the decision focused primarily on the
79. 637 F.2d at 1152 (citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)).
80. 637 F.2d at 1152.
81. 654 F.2d at 463-64.
82. Id. at 464.
83. Id.
84. Id. See supra note 74 for the definition of a security. The stock in Frederiksen, unlike
that in Canfield, was owned by a sole shareholder, and thus arguably did not have the attributes of
ordinary common stock. For a possible conflict in the case law of the Seventh Circuit, see Mc-
Grath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467-68 n.5 (7th Cir. 1981).
85. 654 F.2d at 464. Rapp's argument was based on the approach taken by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868
(1979). The Seventh Circuit in Canfield rejected the Coffin court's analysis. 654 F.2d at 465. But
see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (the Second Circuit, in a two to one deci-
sion, refused to recognize a "sale of business" exception).
86. 654 F.2d at 464.
87. Id. at 465.
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sale of the business assets rather than the stock.88 In the Canfield trans-
action, however, only stock was involved. Thus, Rapp argued that the
predominance of the asset sale in Frederickson was the key indication
that what was being sold was a business, rather than securities.89 The
court was not persuaded by this reasoning. It stated that "to find that a
sale of 100% of the stock brings the transaction within the securities
laws, while a sale of assets plus 100% of the stock does not, would exalt
form over substance." 9  The court noted that while the stock
purchased by Rapp had the characteristics of ordinary stock in Rapp's
hands-the right to vote and receive dividends-this stock was not or-
dinary capital stock because Rapp acquired total control over divi-
dends and voting.91 As the court stated, "When a purchaser acquires
100% of the stock of a corporation and, therefore, for example, can
confer dividends on itself at will, the fact that dividends are a charac-
teristic of ordinary capital stock does not give rise to a justifiable as-
sumption that the federal securities laws apply.
' 92
The appeal of the economic reality test, as applied by the Seventh
Circuit, for determining what constitutes a "security" is twofold: (l) its
simplicity,93 and (2) its exclusion from the federal courts of disputes
88. Id.
89. The court described the factual difference as follows:
In Frederiksen, the purchase price of the corporate assets was over $190,000. An
escrow fund was established with $160,000 of the assets purchase price in order to satisfy
the liabilities of the selling corporation. A separate stock purchase and voting trust
agreement provided that defendant would sell 10% of his stock for $10 and, for an addi-
tional $10, would transfer his remaining 90% of the corporation's stock into a voting trust
controlled by the buyer-plaintiff. The stock in the voting trust was to be redeemed by the
selling corporation from the remainder of the $160,000 escrow fund left after satisfying
the corporation's debts.
Rapp argues that, in Frederiksen, the predominance of the asset sale was the key
indicator of the sale of a business, rather than a sale of securities. Here, however, the
transaction involved only the sale of stock. Here, the parties labeled their contract an
"Agreement for Sale of Stock of Twigg Corporation." Pursuant to the Agreement, Rapp
purchased 100% of the capital stock of Twigg, not Twigg's assets.
Id.
90. Id. at 465-66. The court held:
The economic reality test requires us to look beyond the parties' method of structur-
ing the transaction. There is no doubt that when Rapp purchased 100% of the Twigg
stock, Rapp purchased the entire business. A separate sale of assets would have added
nothing to the economic reality of the transaction.
Id. at 466.
91. Id. at 466 n.7. Such a result is true whenever one entity acquires all the stock of another,
whether in a single purchase or seriatim. Under a seriatim purchase, the acquisition of the bal-
ance of the stock would not be a purchase of securities, even though all the preceding purchases
apparently would be-an anomalous result.
92. Id.
93. One cannot help but speculate, however, upon future factual scenarios. If, for example,
Rapp had a co-buyer of even a small portion of the Twigg stock, the transaction would apparently
have been found by the Seventh Circuit to be covered by the securities laws. But see Sutter v.
Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed infra note 94. Further, the definition of a "secur-
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arising out of the acquisition of small corporations by a single pur-
chaser. There is, however, no "small business" or "single buyer" ex-
ception in the federal securities laws and the rule emerging in the
Seventh Circuit should be watched with interest, both for its reception
in other circuits and for possible resolution by the Supreme Court of
the emerging conflict between circuits.
94
Trecker v. Scag
In a case which is of interest primarily because of Judge Posner's
concurrence, a panel of the Seventh Circuit" reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in Trecker v. Scag.9 6 In August,
1979, Thomas Trecker filed suit, under Section 10(b) of the SEA97 and
Rule lOb-5, 98 against Dane Scag, his former business associate; Wis-
consin Marine, Inc. (WMI), the business they had founded together;
and Ransomes, Sims and Jefferies, Ltd. (Ransomes), a British corpora-
tion that had purchased a 34.1% interest in WMI in the summer of
1978.99
When Trecker and Scag went into business together and formed
WMI, with Scag contributing sixty percent and Trecker forty percent of
ity" in such circumstances depends on the characteristics which the stock will have in the hands of
the buyer after the transaction, as opposed to its characteristics before the sale.
94. Compare Canfield, Frederiksen and King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982) with
Golden v. Garofalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) and Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d
1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). In rejecting Frederiksen, the Second Circuit in
Golden pointed out that the Supreme Court treats the determination of whether a particular in-
strument is a "security" as one which does not vary from time to time depending on the holdings
of the parties or their intentions regarding a particular transaction. The "sale of business" excep-
tion, however, treats instruments as "securities" for some purposes but not for others. 678 F.2d at
1143-44.
The Seventh Circuit reconsidered the "sale of business" doctrine in Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d
197 (7th Cir. 1982), in light of the Second Circuit's rejection of it in Golden, and the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982). In a unanimous
opinion, again authored by Judge Posner, the court in Sutter reaffirmed that the sale of an entire
business to a single purchaser is not a sale of a "security" for purposes of federal law, "even if it is
accomplished by a sale of stock or other securities," 687 F.2d at 189. The Seventh Circuit further
adopted a new presumption for cases where a purchaser has acquired more than 50% but less than
100% of the stock of a corporation. In such cases, the court established a rebuttable presumption
that the buyer purchased the stock for purposes of "entrepreneurship" rather than investment.
Thus, unless the purchaser can show that his main purpose was investment, he will be held not to
have purchased a "security." Id. at 203. This expansion of the 100% purchase doctrine enunci-
ated in Frederiksen and Canfield occurred too late for detailed discussion in this article, but cer-
tainly increases the likelihood of eventual Supreme Court review of the "sale of business"
doctrine.
95. Judges Cummings, Swygert and Posner.
96. 679 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. See supra note 61.
98. See supra note 62.
99. 679 F.2d at 704.
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the capital, they agreed to a stock redemption plan. °° In December,
1973, Trecker asked to be bought out under the terms of the agreement,
but WMI claimed it had insufficient funds with which to honor the
redemption request. In 1976, Trecker sued in state court seeking spe-
cific performance of the redemption agreement or, in the alternative,
the dissolution of the corporation.' 0 ' In February, 1978, the state court
held that Trecker was entitled to specific performance and, in a sepa-
rate hearing in May, 1978, his stock was valued as of December 31,
1976, at $160,845.102
While the state court action was pending, Scag initiated negotia-
tions to sell WMI to Ransomes. The deal, in which Ransomes agreed
to provide a total of $624,176 in exchange for a 34.1% interest in WMI,
was finalized in the spring of 1978.103 Trecker had no actual
knowledge of the WMI-Ransomes negotiations during his state court
action because the state court had refused to allow Trecker any discov-
ery as to the terms of the WMI-Ransomes deal. This refusal was made
despite Trecker's argument that the agreement was relevant to his con-
tention that his WMI stock should be valued as of the actual tender.'°4
Consequently, on June 28, 1978, WMI paid $160,845 plus interest to
Trecker for his 34.1% interest pursuant to the state court judgment or-
dering specific performance. Two days later, on June 30, 1978, WMI
sold the 34.1% interest to Ransomes for $624,176.105
In July, 1979, Trecker received a copy of Ransomes' annual report,
which disclosed the purchase of a 34.2% interest in WMI. 10 6 Trecker
then filed his lOb-5 suit in federal court alleging that the defendants
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 705.
103. Id. The state court opinion finding Trecker entitled to specific performance was issued
on February 21, 1978. The WMI-Ransomes letter of intent was signed three days later, on Febru-
ary 24, 1978.
The final terms of the WMI-Ransomes deal provided that:
1) Trecker's stock must be fully redeemed as a precondition.
2) Ransomes would pay $124,176 toward redeeming Trecker's stock, would make a $500,000
contribution to WMI capital, would receive shares equalling 34.1% of WMI and Scagg would
issue no additional WMI shares so that Ransomes' interest would not be deleted.
3) Ransomes had until September of 1979 to either exercise its option for the balance of WMI
shares or to cancel and have the $624,176 refunded.
4) Scagg would continue as president of WMI for five years. Id.
104. Id. at 705-06.
105. Id. at 706. In September, 1979, Ransomes exercised its option to acquire the balance of
WMI stock. Id.
106. Id. After the conclusion of the state trial, Trecker continually sought to ascertain the
terms of the WMI-Ransomes agreement. When his various inquiries proved unsuccessful, Treck-
er was forced to purchase shares of Ransomes' stock in order to obtain Ransomes' annual report.
Id.
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had failed to disclose, and later misrepresented, facts regarding the
WMI-Ransomes deal. He further contended that these facts would
have altered his decision to sue in state court to have his shares re-
deemed. 10 7 The Wisconsin district court granted the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the basis that Trecker's suit was time-
barred, and that the non-disclosure was neither material nor deliber-
ate.'0 8 The Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed the Wisconsin dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings. t0 9
The Seventh Circuit stated that because Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 have no federal statute of limitations, state statutes of limitations
are controlling.1 0 However, federal principles of equitable tolling de-
termine when the limitations period begins to run."' The Wisconsin
statute provides its own tolling requirement: suit must be brought
within three years or before "the expiration of one year after the dis-
covery of the facts constituting a violation, whichever first expires."
112
The Seventh Circuit held that the federal tolling doctrine was ap-
plicable in this case to supply a "federal gloss" to the Wisconsin court's
interpretation of the term "discovery." ' 13 The court ultimately held
that the record did not permit the district court to hold that Trecker
knew of the Rule lOb-5 violations at the time of the state court hearing
in June, 1978, 114 and remanded.' 15
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed with the district court's find-
ings that the requirements of materiality and scienter were not satis-
fied. 116 However, in an effort to focus the issue on remand, the court
pointed out that what Trecker was alleging was that if he had known of
Ransomes' negotiations during the pendency of his redemption suit, he
107. Id. at 704.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 710.
110. Id. at 706.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(5) (1982)).
113. 679 F.2d at 706-08 and n.7.
114. Id. at 707-08. Throughout the state court proceedings, Trecker continued to attempt to
discover the details of the WMI-Ransomes deal. Trecker's understanding of the contract was that
Ransomes was to make a $500,000 contribution to capital and pay only $124,176 for his shares of
stock. Even though he suspected that the sale to Ransomes had been put off until he was locked
into the redemption action so that his shares could be sold to Ransomes for substantially more
than he was paid for them, he could demonstrate no harm from the sale because he was paid
$160,000 for his shares. Id. at 706.
115. The Seventh Circuit found that the statute of limitations was not tolled until Trecker
acquired Ransomes' annual report in July of 1979. Thus, Trecker's suit, filed in the federal district
court in August of 1979, was timely. Id. at 708.
116. Id. at 708-10.
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would have abandoned the suit and held on to his shares."17 The court
stated that if Trecker could have dismissed his complaint under Wis-
consin law, "then neither materiality nor scienter is precluded and he
has stated a claim under Rule lOb-5." 118
Judge Posner's concurrence was written "only to express my
doubts whether this case really belongs in the federal courts. I do not
mean that we do not have jurisdiction; I mean that perhaps we should
not have jurisdiction."' 19 The judge pointed out that Wisconsin is the
home of all of the disputants except Ransomes, and that WMI was a
closely held corporation whose stock was not freely traded. Thus, "the
basis of federal jurisdiction over the lawsuit is Scag's use of the mails in
his dealings with Ransomes, but the federal government has no sub-
stantive interest in local transactions just because the parties happen to
send letters to each other."' 20 Judge Posner argues that this case was
one of common law fraud, a matter of state rather than federal law,
and that, in any event, Wisconsin has a statute similar to Rule lOb-5.' 2'
Posner's contention was that Congress, in enacting section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act,' 22 did not intend the federal courts to become
involved in deciding "a garden-variety squabble among shareholders
in a closely held corporation." 123 The judge characterized federal court
jurisdiction in these circumstances as "the unintended result of admin-
istrative and judicial actions that have pushed the federal courts into an
area that a proper conception of federalism would assign to state legis-
latures and judges."1
24
While this characterization of the Trecker suit as a "garden-variety
squabble" may be accurate, Judge Posner cites no legislative history
which would lead one to conclude that Congress did not intend the
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in such disputes. There is some
merit to Judge Posner's feeling that this case "wasted" the time of the
Seventh Circuit. ' 25 Yet there is considerable merit in developing a uni-
form body of federal law in securities cases-even in "garden variety"
117. Id. at 709.
118. Id. at 709-10. The Seventh Circuit stated that "The defendants conceded as much at oral
argument." Id. at 709.
119. Id. at 710 (Posner, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 61.
123. 679 F.2d at 711.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 710. This same feeling may be at work in the Seventh Circuit's emerging doctrine
under Frederiksen and Canfield, which refuses to hear disputes under the federal securities laws
that arise out of the sale of small businesses that happen to be incorporated. See supra notes 64-94
and accompanying text.
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ones-so that buyers and sellers throughout the nation can be assured
of uniform obligations of full and fair disclosure which are enforceable
in the federal courts. Indeed, the potential buyer of a closely held cor-
poration who cannot predict in advance whether the representations he
is receiving are covered by the federal securities laws may not be as
willing to purchase or will insist on some sort of representation dis-
count-surely an economically undesirable result. 26 Further, for the
federal courts to determine what constitutes a "garden variety" securi-
ties case before trial would take nearly as much time as actually trying
the case itself. Without direct action by Congress or the Supreme
Court, the situation is not likely to change.
126. This is analogous to complaints about fraud, misrepresentation and other illegal acts in
markets that are exempt from federal securities law jurisdiction. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), petition for review dismissed as moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982),
where, in urging a regulated options market in Government National Mortgage Association certif-
icate futures, mortgage lenders and others in the industry complained that the unregulated market
had largely dried up because of fraud and uncertainty.
NOTES
&
COMMENTS

